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North Carolina's Theft of Cable Television Service Statute:
Prospects of a Brighter Future for the Cable Television Industry
The past few decades have witnessed what appropriately may be termed a
revolution in the telecommunications industry in the United States. The advent
of new technologies and changes in the tastes of the consuming public have re-
sulted in an unprecedented demand for the wares of the telecommunications
industry. Epitomizing this phenomenon is the cable television industry,1 which
has blossomed from a status of virtual nonexistence in the early 1950s to a mul-
tibillion dollar contemporary enterprise whose services are used by a rapidly
increasing portion of the United States citizenry.2
Cable television's commercial success story has been tainted, however, by
an increase in the theft of cable services without payment of a fee to the cable
companies.3 The incidence of cable service theft transcends the basic problem of
individual homeowners surreptitiously attaching their television sets to the
cables; rather, an entire industry has sprouted that produces and markets de-
vices designed to enable a viewer to receive all of the premium programming of a
cable company without paying for it.4 Cable companies, unlike traditional
broadcasters, 5 are supported primarily by the fees paid by subscribing customers
in return for cable services. 6 It has been estimated, however, that "pirates" are
"stealing. . .900 million dollars a year from cable and pay-TV providers."' 7
1. For a description of the cable television industry, see infra notes 15-20 and accompanying
text.
2. See, eg., Wheeler, Cable Television: Where It's Been, Where It's Headed, 56 FLA. B.J. 228,
228-29 (1982) ("Today, approximately 4,600 [cable] systems serve 23 million TV homes, and the
number of cable subscribers is growing at a rate of more than 250,000 per month. It is expected that
by 1985 the cable industry will have wired more than 40 percent of American homes."); Comment,
Pay Television Legal Protections Against Interception: Backyard Earth Stations Amplify Current Im-
perfections, 87 DICK. L. REv. 95, 99 n.22 (1982) (citing figures indicating that in 1980 44% of all
American television households had access to cable and of that 44%, 50% of the homes subscribed
to cable).
3. See, e-g., 2 C. FERIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, CABLE TELEVISION LAw 26.04 (1984);
Comment, Decoding Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act: A Cause of Action for Unau-
thorized Reception of Subscription Television, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 362, 362 (1981) [hereinafter cited
as Comment, Decoding Section 605]; Comment, Pay Television Piracy: Does Section 605 of the Fed-
eral Communications Act of 1934 Prohibit Signal Piracy-And Should It?, 10 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 531, 531 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Pay Television Piracy].
4. See, e-g., Comment, Pay Television and Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934: A
Need for CongressionalAction, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1249, 1249-50 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Pay Television and Section 605]; Comment, Pay Television Piracy, supra note 3, at 531.
Without a decoder, only basic cable service can be received. See infra notes 18-20 and accompa-
nying text.
5. See Comment, Pay Television and Section 605, supra note 4, at 1249-50.
6. See, eg., Comment, Decoding Section 605, supra note 3, at 362; Comment, Pay Television
and Section 605, supra note 4, at 1249-50.
7. 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 26.04.
Considering the long-term effects on the willingness of currently paying customers to continue
paying, the problem of cable piracy is even greater than the magnitude of immediate revenue losses
indicates. Knowledge that many of their friends and relatives are successfully receiving services and
avoiding payment for them will engender apathy and an incentive not to pay in those who ordinarily
would pay the cable fees.
Also, theft of cable service indirectly results in a loss of revenues to state and local governments
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The North Carolina General Assembly responded to the behests of the cable
industry and in 1978 enacted a statute devoted solely to combatting cable service
theft. 8 The 1978 statute was completely rewritten by the general assembly in
1984.9 The new statute strengthens the criminal penalties against those who
obtain cable services illegally and those who sell or distribute devices designed to
assist purchasers in such illegal activity.10 In addition, cable companies now are
permitted to instigate civil actions for injunctive and monetary relief against per-
sons who previously were subject only to criminal prosecution under the
statute. 11
This Note analyzes North Carolina's new theft of cable service statute by
comparing and contrasting it with its predecessor and with similar statutes in
other states, by addressing its potential constitutional infirmities, by assessing
some of its limitations and inadequacies, and by exploring the possibility of over-
lapping federal causes of action. The Note also discusses whether federal stat-
utes concerning theft of cable television service preempt North Carolina's
statute.
It is imperative for analytical purposes to understand the primary distinc-
tions between the cable television industry and other similar industries that are
plagued by many of the same problems. Currently, four basic methods exist for
distributing pay television. 12 Three of the systems use the airwaves to deliver
their signals to the home. With two of the over-the-air systems, multipoint dis-
tribution service (MDS) and direct broadcast satellites (DBS), the coded signal
is received by an antenna and unscrambled by a decoding device located between
the antenna and the television.1 3 The other over-the-air pay TV system, sub-
scription television (STV), transmits its scrambled signals using the facilities of
because state and local taxes and fees levied against cable companies generally are based on the gross
receipts of the cable companies. These revenues are reduced to the extent that thieves would become
paying customers if they were prevented from stealing cable service. See Ciminelli v. Cablevision,
583 F. Supp. 144, 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
8. See Act of June 16, 1978, ch. 1185, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 86 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-118.5 (1981)). The 1978 statute superseded, for purposes of cable television, a theft of service
statute applicable to a variety of telecommunications services. See Act of May 22, 1973, ch. 648,
1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 962 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-155 (Supp. 1977)). Mr. John Jerose, a
representative of the cable television industry, testified before a House committee regarding the im-
pending threat to the industry posed by service thieves and the inadequacy of the 1983 Act in dealing
with the problem. See Minutes, North Carolina House Committee on Judiciary II, at 1 (June 8,
1978).
A number of states have passed legislation during the past few years in an effort to deter the
activity of cable service thieves. See, eg., Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 144, 158 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (providing citations for state theft of cable service statutes); 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T.
CAsEY, supra note 3, 26.031l] (noting that approximately 25 states have cable theft statutes).
9. See Act of July 5, 1984, ch. 1088, 1984 N.C. Sess. Laws 264 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-118.5 (Supp. 1984)).
10. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(a), (b) (Supp. 1984); infra notes 30-35 and accompanying
text.
11. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(c) (Supp. 1984); infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
12. See Comment, supra note 2, at 98. The four pay television systems are multipoint distribu-
tion service (MDS), direct broadcast satellites (DBS), subscription television (STY), and cable televi-
sion. Id.
13. See 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CAsEY, supra note 3, 1 19.02, 20.02; Comment, supra
note 2, at 101; Comment, Subscription Television Decoders: Can California Prohibit Their Manufac-
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commercial television stations, and thus only a special decoder is required for
interception.1 4 The final pay television delivery system, cable television,15 is
transmitted to the home through wires or coaxial cables.1 6 The primary subject
ture and Sale?, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 839, 843 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Subscrip-
tion Television].
MDS signals are sent from the MDS operator to a satellite which transmits the signals to a
distributor. A microwave transmitter at the distributor's facilities sends the signals to the homes of
individual subscribers. The MDS signal is generally only intelligible on a conventional television set
if the viewer has a special "directive" antenna to intercept the signal and a decoder to decipher and
transform it. See Comment, supra note 2, at 100; Comment, Subscription Television, supra, at 843
(special antenna required because MDS signals travel outside the spectrum of the standard television
broadcast signal).
The FCC recently approved a multiple channel capacity for MDS systems, but MDS systems
are still much more limited than cable television systems in channel capacity. See 2 C. FERRIs, F.
LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 5 19.01, 19.09. As a result of its multiple channel capacity,
comparable reception costs, and lower capital investment requirements, MDS should compete well
with the other pay television delivery systems. See id. 119.09.
DBS is the newest and least developed pay television system. See Comment, supra note 2, at
101; Comment, Subscription Television, supra, at 843. The DBS system is predicated on a satellite
network concept. "mhe [DBS] system will transmit from four orbitting satellites, one serving each
time zone.. . .The satellite signal will be picked up by a dish-shaped antenna.. .[that] must be
properly aligned and focused in the direction of a particular satellite." Id. One of the small anten-
nas must be located at each subscriber's home. See Comment, supra note 2, at 101. It has been
estimated that the DBS antenna will be mass-produced and sold for approximately $200, putting it
within the financial reach of private homeowners. See 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra
note 3, $ 20.02 n.4.
The prospects for commercial success for DBS are good. DBS has multichannel capacity, see 2
C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 1 20.02, and it is superior to the other pay television
technologies because of its more concentrated signal, which results in clearer reception. See Com-
ment, supra note 2, at 101.
14. See 2 C. FERRIs, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 1 18.02.
STV is the only pay TV service that operates in the "standard broadcast frequency spectrum."
Comment, Subscription Television, supra note 13, at 839. "The [STV] signals are receivable on
standard television sets equipped for ultra high frequencies (UHF), but are encoded so that only
subscribers whose televisions are equipped with decoding devices receive a comprehensible
message." Comment, Decoding Section 605, supra note 3, at 362. The STV companies rent the
decoder devices to paying customers. See Comment, supra note 2, at 101. STV systems do not use
satellites. Id.
STV is at a competitive disadvantage because it is limited to a single channel capacity of pay
programming, and consequently STV's commercial success has begun to wane in recent years when
contrasted with the other pay TV technologies. See 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note
3, 1 18.05 (decline of STV attributed primarily to multichannel capabilities of competitors).
15. See Comment, Subscription Television, supra note 13, at 841-44.
16. Every cable television system has one or more antennas located on high ground to pick up
signals to be sent to the "head-end" for processing. See Wheeler, supra note 2, at 229. One antenna
is used "to receive local over the air broadcast signals. Other antennas pick up distant television
station or specialized cable network signals transmitted from microwave relay stations or communi-
cations satellites." 1 C. FEsRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 1 5.02. The "head-end" is a
processing center that receives the signals from the antenna, amplifies them for "maximum strength
and clarity," and then converts them into cable television frequencies for transmission over the cable
system. See, eg., id.; Donaldson, Minnesota's Approach to the Regulation of Cable Television, 10
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 413, 414 n.4 (1984).
A network of cables connects each receiver to the "head-end" or source of the signal. A
"trunk" line conducts the signals from the head-end through major streets or thorough-
fares. Those signals then travel through smaller "feeder" lines into individual homes. Ulti-
mately, each subscriber has a separate line to the cable.
Stem, The Evolution of Cable Television Regulation: A Proposal for the Future, 21 URB. L. ANN.
179, 181-83 (1981); see also 1 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, II 5.02-5.03 (provid-
ing an excellent description of the cable television system and a synopsis of the historical develop-
ment of cable television); Donaldson, supra, at 414 n.4 (discussing the components of a cable
television system).
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of this Note is cable television. 17
All cable television subscribers pay a minimum periodic fee which entitles
them to receive basic service. 18 In addition, most cable television operators offer
optional channels and premium services for an additional fee; in return for pay-
ment of the fee, subscribers receive one or more mechanical devices that enable
reception of the additional broadcasts.1 9 Theft of cable television service may be
theft of basic service, theft of premium service, or both.20
While the terminology and designations employed above are the ones most
commonly used in discussing the pay television industry, some commentators
use the phrase "cable television" generically to refer collectively to all the pay
television technologies. 2 1 For purposes of analyzing the North Carolina statute,
it is important to ascertain the meaning attributed to "cable television system"
by the general assembly. Although the 1984 theft of cable service statute does
not expressly define "cable television system," a complete definition is found in
North Carolina General Statutes section 160A-319.
"[C]able television system" means any system or facility that, by
means of a master antenna and wires or cables, or by wires or cables
alone, receives, amplifies, modifies, transmits, or distributes any televi-
sion, radio, or electronic signal, audio or video or both, to subscribing
17. In its early years, cable television was referred to as community antenna television (CATV)
because of its initial development to provide television service to small communities that were unable
to receive ordinary broadcast signals. See, eg., Comment, Pay Television: The Pendulum Swings
Toward Deregulation, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 86, 86 n.1 (1978).
18. See Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 144, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
"[C]able companies offer, as a minimum level of service, what is referred to as basic service.
While the content of basic service varies from one cable company to another, it generally consists of
local broadcast television signals, and local government and public access programming." Id.
19. See id.; Comment, supra note 2, at 99-100; Comment, supra note 17, at 86 n.l.
To receive the premium cable services, viewers usually must connect a converter and a decoder
to their television sets. A converter increases the channel capacity of the television set, and a de-
coder unscrambles the premium service signals so that they will be intelligible. Cable companies
provide these devices to paying subscribers. See Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 144, 148
(E.D.N.Y. 1984); Cox Cable Cleveland Area, Inc. v. King, 582 F. Supp. 376, 378 (N.D. Ohio 1983);
Comment, supra note 17, at 86 n.l. "These pay services offer programs and features not otherwise
available to television viewers, such as first-run movies, special entertainment programs, boxing and
other programs." Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 144, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
20. North Carolina's theft of cable service statute is broad enough to encompass both types of
theft. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(a), (b) (Supp. 1984).
Theft of basic service occurs when a homeowner attaches a cable from his home to the system's
trunk line or to the feeder line of a neighbor or when a homeowner who at some time in the past has
received cable service and has a cable attached to his home that was installed by the cable company
reconnects his television set to the cable television wire. Premium service is stolen by procuring
"black-market" converters and decoders to attach to the cable wire inside the home. For a discus-
sion of the various methods of stealing cable television service, see H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 83 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4655, 4720; 2 C. FERRIS, F.
LLOYD & T. CAEY, supra note 3, 26.01; Comment, Electronic Piracy: Can the Cable Television
Industry Prevent Unauthorized Interception?, 13 ST. MARY'S L.J 587, 592 (1982).
21. See Comment, supra note 20, at 587 n.1. ("[C]able television is any television service that
is provided for a fee and interception of that service without compensation deprives the originator of
a source of income."). One commentator referred to STV as "cable television" but acknowledged
that this usage of the term was "actually a misnomer because STV is devoid of cable in its carriage of
the television signal." Note, National Subscription Television v. S & H TV: The Problem of Unau-
thorized Interception of Subscription Television-Are the Legal Airwaves Unscrambled?, 9 PEP-
PERDINE L. REv. 641, 641 n. (1981).
12991985]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
members of the public for compensation.22
The statutory requirement that "wires or cables" be an integral part of the sys-
tem automatically excludes the three over-the-air methods23 for distributing pay
television signals. There being no indication in the theft of cable service statute
that a different definition is to apply, this Note will presume that the narrow,
traditional definition of "cable television" expresses the intent of the general as-
sembly and, therefore, that the theft statute does not apply to any over-the-air
pay television signals.24 This analysis is implicitly supported by a provision in
the new statute that states: "The receipt, decoding or converting of a signal
from the air by the use of a satellite dish or antenna shall not constitute a viola-
tion of this section."25
North Carolina's 1984 amendment of its theft of cable service law is a total
redraft of the prior statute.26 In addition to strengthening the criminal sanctions
against violators, it creates a civil cause of action against cable service thieves.
The statute, codified as section 14-118.5 of the North Carolina General Statutes,
defines and prohibits two general categories of conduct that contribute to the
theft of cable service. First, the statute prohibits unauthorized connections to
the cables or other equipment of a cable television system for the purpose of
receiving cable service. 27 This basic provision is in all statutes that specifically
prohibit cable service theft because the conduct prohibited is the actual gaining
of unauthorized access to cable service. A second and extremely important pro-
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-319 (1982). Section 160A-319 grants authority to municipalities
to award franchises to cable companies for operation within the city.
Even though the definition of cable television system given in § 160A-319 is preceded by the
language "[flor the purposes of this section," because no definition was provided in either the origi-
nal or the amended version of the theft of cable service statute, it is reasonable to infer that the
general assembly intended for the definition in § 160A-319 to apply.
23. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
24. This definition is compatible with the preceding textual discussion of cable television. See
supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. For a discussion of whether North Carolina's theft of
cable service statute should be extended to cover other types of pay television systems, see infra notes
80-84 & 128-37 and accompanying text.
25. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(f) (Supp. 1984). Cable companies frequently purchase pre-
mium viewing materials that are conveyed to the cable company "head-ends" in the form of over-
the-air transmissions for processing to be sent to the cable television subscribers over the cable sys-
tem. See, eg., Cablevision v. Annasonic Elec. Supply, No. 83-5159 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1984) (rele-
vant part included as appendix in Ciminelli v. Cablevision (Ciminelli II), 583 F. Supp. 158, 163
(E.D.N.Y. 1984)); Cox Cable Cleveland Area, Inc. v. King, 582 F. Supp. 376, 378-79 (N.D. Ohio
1983); Comment, supra note 2, at 99-100. Given this common purchasing arrangement, § 14-
118.5(f) apparently was included to indicate unambiguously that the new statute does not cover all
signal transmissions of proprietary interest to cable companies but rather only actual cable
transmissions.
26. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5 (1981) (earlier statute) with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
118.5 (Supp. 1984) (amendment).
27. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(a) (Supp. 1984). The statute states:
Any person . . . who . . . knowingly and willfully attaches or maintains an elec-
tronic, mechanical or other connection to any cable, wire, decoder, converter, device or
equipment of a cable television system or removes, tampers with, modifies or alters any
cable, wire, decoder, converter, device or equipment of a cable television system for the
purpose of intercepting or receiving any programming or service transmitted by such cable
television system which person . . . is not authorized by the cable television system to
receive, is guilty of [violating this statute].
1300 [Vol. 63
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW
hibition in section 14-118.5 makes illegal the act of "knowingly and willfully,
without the authorization of a cable television system, distribut[ing], sell[ing],
attempt[ing] to sell or possess[ing] for sale in North Carolina any converter,
decoder, device, or kit, that is designed to decode or descramble any encoded or
scrambled signal transmitted by [a] cable television system .... ,"28 This type
of provision is in many state theft of cable service statutes.29
The 1984 amendment to section 14-118.5 provides for somewhat harsher
criminal sanctions than did the earlier version.30 A person convicted of violat-
ing the 1978 statute was guilty of a misdemeanor and could be compelled to pay
a fine of up to $300, to serve a jail sentence of up to sixty days, or both.31 The
amended version of the statute provides different penalties for the two different
violations.32 If a person illegally attaches to or tampers with the cable or equip-
ment of a cable company, then that person has committed a misdemeanor and
may be fined up to $500, placed in jail for up to thirty days, or both.33 On the
other hand, if the defendant is convicted of selling or possessing for sale any of
the enumerated devices, the maximum imprisonment increases to six months.34
Even though the criminal penalties permitted by the 1984 amendment
strengthen the prior law, North Carolina's criminal penalties are still relatively
mild compared to those allowed in some other states.3 5
The new statute, when contrasted with its predecessor, is unabashedly sym-
pathetic to the plight of North Carolina cable companies in their battle against
those who receive cable service without paying for it.36 The inclusion of a provi-
sion against the sale of decoding devices is quite significant for purposes of en-
forcing the policy behind the statute because as a practical matter it is much
simpler to detect the public marketing of devices than it is to detect their illegal
use in the home.37 Also, proscribing the activity of the sellers of such devices
28. Id. § 14-118.5(b). For a brief discussion regarding the importance of such devices, see
supra note 19 and accompanying text.
29. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 593d(b) (West Supp. 1984); GA. 'CODE ANN. § 46-5-3
(1981); Act of Sept. 26, 1980, art. 1, § 23, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-10(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984-85); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1737(A)(4) (West Supp. 1984-85); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-35-
24 (1981).
30. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(a), (b) (Supp. 1984).
31. See id. § 14-118.5(d) (1981).
32. See id. § 14-118.5(a), (b) (Supp. 1984).
33. Id. § 14-118.5(a).
34. Id. § 14-118.5(b). See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text for the likely rationale
behind imposing harsher sanctions on this type of conduct.
35. See, eg., CAL. PENAL CODE § 593d (West Supp. 1984) ($1,000 or 90 days in jail or both for
unauthorized interception, and $10,000 or jail term or both for selling devices); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21, § 1737(A) (West Supp. 1984-85) ($1,000 or six months in jail or both).
36. As one would expect, the indications are that the cable industry has lobbied for protection
from service thieves. See supra note 8.
37. See State v. Scott, 8 Ohio App. 3d 1, 6, 455 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (1983). Commenting on the
sufficiency of the evidence against the private homeowner defendant, the court said:
mhe evidence ... tended to prove mere possession of the [converter] device, not actual
acquisition by the appellant of the cable television service. The evidence of possession
consisted of ... observations of the converter unit on the appellant's television set and
appellant's admission of possession and that the unit was connected to his television set
.... [N]o evidence [was] presented from which a jury could reasonably infer that appel-
lant actually acquired the cable television service.
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facilitates enforcement; an action against a single seller attacks the problem ear-
lier and at its root.38
Regardless of how extreme the threatened punishment, however, without
aggressive enforcement by law enforcement officials, the punishment factor be-
comes illusory and the deterrent effect is diluted. It has been suggested that
theft of cable services is considered a low priority crime by law enforcement
authorities. 39 Considering the vast number of urgent, life-threatening crimes
that occur, the limited resources of most law enforcement agencies, and the diffi-
culty of detecting basic cable service theft,4° this conclusion is not surprising.
Unquestionably, therefore, the most significant feature of the amended stat-
Id.; see also infra note 40 (discussing detection methods); 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra
note 3, % 26.04 (discussing methods employed by cable companies to discover unauthorized recipi-
ents of cable services).
Some of the electronic surveillance techniques now used by pay TV distributors to detect unau-
thorized interception devices in homes raise intriguing invasion of privacy questions. In Movie Sys.,
Inc. v. Heller, 710 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983), an MDS distributor used electronic surveillance to
discover that an individual was using a microwave antenna and a special converter to intercept MDS
signals illegally. When sued by the MDS company, Heller counterclaimed, arguing that plaintiff's
use of electronic surveillance was a violation of Heller's fourth and fourteenth amendment privacy
rights. In rejecting defendant's privacy argument, the court said, "Heller's constitutional claim is
without merit because the constitutional prohibitions of the fourth and fourteenth amendments do
not apply to actions by private persons. . . [and] Heller has alleged no facts nor does the record
reveal any facts which would support a finding of state action." Id. at 496. The court also rejected a
state invasion of privacy claim on grounds that the state did not recognize a privacy cause of action.
Id.
Such a claim could not, of course, be dismissed as not involving state action in cases in which a
criminal defendant claimed a fourth amendment violation by police using electronic surveillance of
cable theft. Use of electronic surveillance in the past has been found to violate the fourth amend-
ment. See, eg., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-53 (1967) (holding that plaintiff's fourth
amendment rights were infringed by the enforcement agent's use of an electronic device to listen to
plaintiff's conversation in public telephone booth); see also 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY,
supra note 3, 26.04 (briefly mentioning possible invasion of privacy problems arising from elec-
tronic detection methods).
38. In effect, these statutory provisions prohibit activity (i.e., marketing of devices) that ulti-
mately enables the actual theft of premium services to occur.
39. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15(4) commentary on 1983 amendment (McKinney Supp.
1984-85) ("The problem is not that the statute needed explication and tightening but that the public
and law enforcement agencies are not particularly distressed about the problems facing the cable
television entrepreneurs. Avoiding cable television charges is widely viewed in the same light as
creative income tax calculation.").
A very plausible explanation for the lax enforcement of criminal sanctions against individual
homeowners who illegally receive cable services is the difficulty in detecting offenses and the danger
of a fourth amendment privacy violation by a law enforcement official. See supra note 37 and ac-
companying text. This reasoning is particularly strong in the case of a homeowner who subscribes to
basic service, see supra notes 18 & 20 and accompanying text, but purchases a converter/decoder
and illegally connects it so that he can receive premium service, see supra notes 19-20 and accompa-
nying text, without paying the subscription fee. In this situation the only evidence of the criminal
activity is inside the home.
There is no similarly persuasive argument to justify the lack of enforcement against those who
illegally manufacture and sell cable converter/decoder devices. The detection problems are not
nearly as acute in this context.
40. In spite of the difficulty of detecting unauthorized receipt of cable television services, "cable
. . . companies are developing ways to detect unauthorized receivers. Detections are made through
electronic surveillance, through spot, rooftop inspections for illegal antennas and earth stations, and
through in-house inspection with the homeowner's permission, the latter usually made in conjunc-
tion with a 'service call."' 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 26.04.
The use of electronic surveillance to detect unauthorized receipt of cable services raises fourth
amendment and state invasion of privacy issues. See supra note 37.
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ute is its provision allowing cable companies to instigate civil suits against ser-
vice thieves and those who aid them.4 1 This concept is relatively novel and is
found in only a few state statutes.42 Under section 14-118.5(c), cable companies
are authorized to bring civil suits to enjoin 43 violations of substantive prohibi-
tions of the statute44 and to recover damages.45 The statute mandates that a
cable company that establishes a violation be awarded the greater of "actual
damages" 46 trebled47 or a fixed default amount, which is dependent upon the
type of violation.48 Furthermore, section 14-118.5(d) clarifies the damage provi-
sion by stating, "It is not a necessary prerequisite to a civil action instituted
pursuant to this section that the plaintiff has suffered or will suffer actual dam-
ages."' 49 Thus, even if the cable company is unable to prove any real loss or legal
41. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(c) (Supp. 1984). Authorization of the civil suit should
compensate for many of the deficiencies in criminal sanctions and criminal enforcement. See supra
notes 35 & 39 and accompanying text. Although the detection problems, see supra note 37 and
accompanying text, are still present, the remedies available in the civil action should provide an
incentive for cable companies to devote substantial funds and manpower to the task of discovering
cable service theft. An assessment of the ultimate impact in North Carolina of the newly created
civil action is of course speculative, but the statute's patent slant in favor of cable companies, see
supra notes 8 & 36 and accompanying text; infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text, would lead one
to conclude that cable entrepreneurs will pursue legal remedies aggressively. Evaluating the reaction
of cable companies to the theft of service problem, one commentator said:
[P]ay and cable companies, supported by state theft-of-cable service statutes, are waging a
war on piracy. The battles are being fought through the media (public awareness pro-
grams, television commercials, and newspaper advertisements informing the public that
use of unauthorized intercepting devices violates the law); through amnesty programs for
consumers who turn in their unauthorized devices; and through prosecution.
2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CAsEY, supra note 3, q 26.04.
42. See 2 C. FERRIs, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 1 26.0311] ("With the exception of a
few states. . . the applicable state theft of [cable] service laws only provide for criminal liability.").
Civil action provisions, however, are becoming more common in cable service theft statutes.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 593d(c)-(e) (West Supp. 1984); Act of June 22, 1983, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 16-13 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1737(C) (West Supp.
1984-85).
North Carolina's new statute, although certainly a product of this trend, is in many respects
more progressive from the viewpoint of cable companies than most of its counterparts in other
jurisdictions.
43. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(c) (Supp. 1984).
44. See id. § 14-118.5(a), (b).
45. Id. § 14-118.5(c)(1)-(2).
46. The statute does not define "actual damages." The term has, however, been defined by the
North Carolina Supreme Court. "Actual damages means 'compensation for injuries and losses
which are the direct and proximate result of the [wrong] .... ' " Godwin v. Vinson, 254 N.C. 582,
587, 119 S.E.2d 616, 620 (1961). "[Aictual damages refer to compensation for injury and losses
which are the proximate and direct result of a wrong. . . .Thus, loss of profits may be recovered if
plaintiff introduces evidence from which the amount of such loss can be ascertained by the jury with
reasonable certainty." 5 N.C. INDEX 3D Damages § 2 (1977).
47. Treble damages are the maximum civil damages allowed in any state theft of cable service
statute. See 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CAsEY, supra note 3, 26.03[1].
48. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(c)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1984). When the culpable conduct is the
actual theft of cable services, see id. § 14-118.5(a), then the default damage amount is $300; if the
defendant's conduct involves the manufacturing or selling of cable interception devices, see id. § 14-
118.5(b), then the default damage amount is $1000. Id. § 14-118.5(c)(1)-(2).
49. Id. § 14-118.5(d). For a discussion of the meaning of "actual damages," see supra note 46.
Other treble damages theft of cable service statutes similarly state that a recovery by the plaintiff is
not dependent upon proof of "actual damages." See, ag., CAL. PENAL CODE § 593d(e) (West Supp.
1984); Act of June 22, 1983, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-13(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1737(E) (West Supp. 1984-85).
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injury as a result of defendant's activity, 50 it shall nevertheless be granted the
statutory default damage amount.-" Absent, however, from the North Carolina
theft of cable service statute is a provision, found in the statutes of some other
states, expressly providing for the recovery of attorney's fees and costs by a cable
company in a successful civil action.5 2 Considering the comprehensive nature of
the new statute, it seems doubtful that this absence was merely an oversight by
the general assembly.5
3
Even though the new North Carolina statute makes liable only those who
knowingly and willfully violate its terms, there is a statutory presumption of
knowledge on the part of the defendant once basic proof of a violation is intro-
duced.54 This prima facie presumption represents the general assembly's recog-
nition of the extreme difficulty in many cases of proving that the defendant
actually played a role in illegally gaining access to the cable system.55 Cases in
other jurisdictions, however, have raised serious questions about the constitu-
50. See supra note 46.
51. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(c) (Supp. 1984).
52. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 593d(c)(2) (West Supp. 1984) (reasonable attorney's fees);
Act of June 22, 1983, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-13(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85) (all costs
plus reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 63-10-2 (1978) (costs
plus attorney's fees); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1737(C)(2) (West Supp. 1984-85) (attorney's fees).
53. There is a well-established rule in North Carolina that "a successful litigant may not re-
cover attorneys' fees, whether as costs or as an item of damages, unless such a recovery is expressly
authorized by statute." Stillwell Enters., Inc. v. Interstate Equip. Co., 300 N.C. 286, 289, 266 S.E.2d
812, 814 (1980). Therefore, it is unlikely that a trial judge would exercise discretion to award attor-
ney's fees to a plaintiff who prevails in an action under North Carolina's theft of cable service statute.
54. The statute states:
Proof that any equipment, cable, wire, decoder, converter or device of a cable televi-
sion system was modified, removed, altered, tampered with or connected without the con-
sent of such cable system in violation of this section shall be prima facie evidence that such
action was taken knowingly and willfully by the person or persons in whose name the cable
system's equipment, cable, wire, decoder, converter or device is installed or the person or
persons regularly receiving the benefits of cable services resulting from such unauthorized
modification, removal, alteration, tampering or connection.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(e) (Supp. 1984). An analogous presumption provision has been a part
of North Carolina statutory law prohibiting the theft of electric, gas, and water services since 1977.
See Id. § 14-151.1(b) (1981) (proof of tampering with meter is prima facie evidence of violation).
The theft of cable service statutes of some other states contain presumptions very much like the
one found in North Carolina's new statute. See, eg., Act of June 22, 1983, § 1, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, §§ 16-11(d), -12(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984-85); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15(5) (McKinney
Supp. 1984-85); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1737(B) (West Supp. 1983-84); VA. CODE § 18.2-165.1
(1982).
55. In a New Jersey case involving a theft of utility services statute that contained a presump-
tion very similar to North Carolina's, the court said, "It is apparent that. . . the presumption was
adopted by the Legislature because of the practical impossibility of proving by direct evidence the
actual participation of the consumer in the illegal activity." State v. Curtis, 148 N.J. Super. 235, 240,
372 A.2d 612, 615 (Crim. Ct. 1977). In State v. Robinson, 97 Misc. 2d 47, 56, 411 N.Y.S.2d 793,
799 (Crim. Ct. 1978), the court, discussing this presumption in its theft of utility services statute,
stated:
This presumption was reinstated when the Legislature recognized the difficulty of ob-
taining proof of actual tampering. "Such proof can be produced only in the rare instance
where one is caught red-handed altering the electrical circuit to by-pass a meter." . ..
[citations omitted] If tampering was to be effectively deterred then the presumption was
. . . essential.
Id. (quoting State v. Mendez, 94 Misc. 2d 447, 449, 404 N.Y.S.2d 977, 979 (Crim. Ct. 1978)). For a
description of the practical effect upon plaintiff's case of not having the presumption, see State v.
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tionality of such a statutory presumption.56 Similar presumptions have been
challenged primarily on the ground that they deny defendants their fourteenth
amendment due process rights.57
In State v. Scott58 the Ohio Court of Appeals struck down as unconstitu-
tional a provision in Ohio's theft of cable service statute59 that provided for a
prima facie presumption of intent.6 0 The Ohio court distinguished between
mandatory and permissive presumptions 61 and held that the language of the
Ohio statute unambiguously revealed that the presumption was mandatory.6
2
After noting that mere proof of the unauthorized possession of a device for re-
ceiving cable services compelled the fact-finder to find all the remaining essential
elements of the offense, the court applied the test for determining the constitu-
tionality of such presumptions and concluded that "we cannot say with substan-
tial assurance that the presumed facts. . .[are] more likely than not to flow
from the proved fact ... *"63
In assessing the constitutionality of the North Carolina statute's presump-
tion of intent, it is important also to look to the line of authority that rejects the
rationale and result in Scott. In State v. Robinson" the New York court upheld
a presumption that was, for purposes of this analysis, substantially similar to the
Ohio statutory provision in Scott.65 Like the statutes in North Carolina and
Scott, 8 Ohio App. 3d 1, 5, 455 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (1983); see also supra note 37 (discussing the
difficulties in obtaining sufficient evidence against the homeowner defendant).
A careful reading of § 14-118.5(e), which does not refer to the distribution of devices, reveals
that the presumption applies only to the type of conduct prohibited in § 14-118.5(a). In other words,
the presumption applies only to the actual theft of cable service and not to the selling of converter/
decoder devices, which is proscribed by § 14-118.5(b). The limited application of the presumption
makes sense because the activity of selling mechanical devices is much easier to detect and prove
than the use of such devices inside the home to steal cable services. See supra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text.
56. See State v. Curtis, 148 N.J. Super. 235, 372 A.2d 612 (App. Div. 1977); State v. Robinson,
97 Misc. 2d 47, 411 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Crim. Ct. 1978); State v. Scott, 8 Ohio App. 3d 1, 455 N.E.2d
1363 (1983).
57. See State v. Curtis, 148 N.J. Super. 235, 239-40, 372 A.2d 612, 614-15 (App. Div. 1977);
State v. Robinson, 97 Misc. 2d 47, 57, 411 N.Y.S.2d 793, 799 (Crim. Ct. 1978).
58. 8 Ohio App. 3d 1, 5, 455 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (1983).
59. See Act of July 13, 1977, H.B. No. 271, 1977 Ohio Laws 2278 (repealed 1984).
60. See id. (repealed 1984).
61. Scott, 8 Ohio App. 3d at 4-5, 455 N.E.2d at 1368. A permissive presumption permits the
factfinder to infer the "elemental fact" after the "basic fact" is established. With a mandatory pre-
sumption, the factfinder is required to "find" the "elemental fact" upon proof of the "basic fact." Id.
62. Id. at 4, 455 N.E.2d at 1368 (presumption is mandatory on its face). The statute construed
in Scott stated:
The existence, on property in the actual possession of the accused, of any connection, wire,
conductor, or any device whatsoever, which effects the use of cable television service with-
out the same being reported for payment as to service,. . . shall be prima-facie evidence of
intent to violate and of the violation of this section by the accused.
Act of July, 13, 1977, H.B. No. 271, 1977 Ohio Laws 2278 (repealed 1984).
63. Scott, 8 Ohio App. at 5, 455 N.E.2d at 1367-69; see also MacMillan v. State, 358 So. 2d 547,
549-50 (Fla. 1978) (declaring unconstitutional provision in theft of service statute providing for pre-
sumption of intent to violate).
64. 97 Misc. 2d 47, 411 N.Y.S.2d 793 (Crim. Ct. 1978).
65. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 165.15(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85). The relevant portion of the
New York statute states:
[P]roof. . .that telecommunications equipment, including, without limitation, any cable
1985] 1305
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Ohio, the New York statute provided that proof of an illegal connection to a
utility service "shall be presumptive evidence" that the recipient of the service
was responsible for the unlawful connection. 66 The Robinson court, however,
interpreted the statutory language as creating a permissive, rather than a
mandatory, presumption.67 Furthermore, the Robinson court held that the pre-
sumption satisfied constitutional requirements because the defendant's receipt of
the utility services as a result of the illegal tampering provided a sufficient "ra-
tional connection between the presumed fact and the proven fact."' 68 In effect,
the New York court in Robinson employed an analysis and reached a decision
diametrically opposed to the analysis and decision in Scott.
As the Scott and Robinson cases illustrate, there are plausible and compel-
ling arguments both for and against the constitutionality of the section 14-
118.5(e) presumption. Should the new presumption be found unconstitutional,
it would be possible to sever section 14-118.5(e) without invalidating the entire
statute.69 Although the remainder of the statute logically could stand without
the presumption, the practical effect of severing the presumption provision
would be to assure victory for many defendants.70 Without the benefit of the
presumption, plaintiffs or prosecutors would prevail only if they could present
affirmative evidence that defendants "knowingly and willfully" tapped on to the
cable system "for the purpose of intercepting or receiving. . . programming or
service." '71 In most cases this would be a difficult burden to satisfy.72
The federal antitrust laws present a second potential challenge to the North
Carolina theft of cable service statute; in prohibiting all parties except cable
companies from selling and distributing converter and decoder devices, the stat-
television converter, descrambler, receiver, or related equipment, has been connected to the
equipment of the supplier of the service without the consent of the supplier of the service,
shall be presumptive evidence that the resident to whom the service which is at the time
being furnished by or through such equipment has, with intent to avoid payment by him-
self or another person for a prospective or already rendered service, created or caused to be
created with reference to such equipment, the condition so existing.
Id.
66. See id.
67. 97 Misc. 2d at 61, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 802 (rejecting defendant's argument that the statutory
presumption effected a shift in the ultimate burden of proof).
68. 97 Misc. 2d at 59, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 800-01. Reaching the same result on a New Jersey
statutory presumption in a substantially similar context, the court in State v. Curtis said:
[i]t is more likely than not that the customer [defendant] participated in the tampering
resulting in the failure of the meter to record fully the current supplied to that customer
... . Such an inference is rational when tested by human conduct and experience, for the
only person who would usually be motivated to tamper with a meter is the one who would
profit financially ....
148 N.J. Super. 235, 239-40, 372 A.2d 612, 615 (App. Div. 1977).
69. For a case in which the court declared a similar presumption unconstitutional, severed the
stricken part, and allowed the remainder of the statute to stand, see MacMillan v. State, 358 So. 2d
547, 550 (Fla. 1978).
70. Of course, invalidation of the presumption would not substantially affect actions in which
the defendant is accused of dealing in converter/decoder devices under § 14-118.5(b). See supra note
55 and accompanying text.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(a) (Supp. 1984).
72. See State v. Curtis, 148 N.J. Super. 235, 240-41, 372 A.2d 612, 615 (App. Div. 1977); see
also supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing the need for a presumption provision).
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ute might violate the antitrust laws by giving a monopoly in the marketing of
such mechanisms to cable companies. 73 Such a challenge, however, probably
would fail. Plaintiff in Ciminelli v. Cablevision74 was prevented from selling con-
verter and decoder devices by a New York statutory provision7 5 similar to
North Carolina's section 14-118.5(b). 76 He sued to enjoin enforcement of the
state statute, arguing that it was preempted by the Sherman and Clayton federal
antitrust statutes. 77 Using reasoning that would be applicable to an antitrust
challenge to section 14-118.5(b), the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York rejected the claim. The court noted that the state action
immunity doctrine provides an exemption from the antitrust laws when "the
activities constitute the action of the state in its sovereign capacity.' '7 8 Finding
that the New York Legislature enacted the statute in its sovereign capacity and
that the statute served a legitimate state interest, the court ended its inquiry and
upheld the validity of the state law.79 This same reasoning probably would pro-
tect North Carolina's statute from a similar antitrust challenge.
An apparent flaw in the North Carolina statute is its failure to cover the
primary noncable forms of pay television.80 Theft of pay television service stat-
utes in some states prohibit the unauthorized interception of both over-the-air
pay television signals and cable services.8 1 The phenomenal growth and promis-
ing future of noncable pay television systems 82 raises the question whether the
North Carolina General Assembly was shortsighted in not extending protection
in section 14-118.5 to over-the-air pay television transmissions. If the general
assembly was shortsighted, its omission could be remedied easily by either
amending the statute to cover all pay television signals or by enacting a new
statute specifically to protect over-the-air signals. The omission, however, was
73. See Ciminelli v. Cablevision, 583 F. Supp. 144, 152-58 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
74. 583 F. Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
75. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(b) (Supp. 1984).
77. Ciminelli, 583 F. Supp. at 152.
78. Id. at 156.
79. Id. at 157. The court said:
The evidence shows that faced with a growing problem of theft of cable television
services, the State of New York, as sovereign, enacted legislation to combat the prob-
lem. . . . [W]e find no merit to the argument that [the statute] serves no legitimate state
interest and instead authorizes defendants to violate the antitrust laws by declaring their
action lawful. Thus, we conclude that the state action exemption applies to this cause of
action.
Id.
80. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
81. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e (West Supp. 1985); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 31.12,
31.13 (Vernon Supp. 1985).
82. See, eg., Comment, Subscription Television, supra note 13, at 839; Comment, Pay Television
Piracy, supra note 3, at 531.
Over-the-air systems are often commercially feasible when cable systems are not. "Unlike cable
television, over-the-air pay TV does not require burdensome initial outlays of time and capital. [cita-
tions omitted] Laying underground or aboveground cable is a time-consuming and expensive pro-
cess. [citations omitted]" Id. at 531 n.3. Generally, there must be at least 30 homes per mile to
make an area potentially profitable for cable companies. See Comment, supra note 2, at 99 n.23;
Note, The Piracy of Subscription Television: An Alternative to the Communications Law, 56 S. CAL.
L. REv. 935, 935 n.3 (1983).
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justifiable when the current version of the North Carolina theft of cable service
statute was passed. Even though at that time theft of over-the-air signals was a
substantial problem for STV and MDS operators, the willingness of the federal
courts to grant relief for such piracy under the Communications Act of 193483
made it less urgent for state legislative bodies to provide a remedy. By contrast,
the availability of comparable federal relief for cable companies was quite
uncertain. 84
Soon after the new North Carolina theft of cable service statute was passed,
however, Congress responded to those who argued that the main body of law
regulating communications, the Communications Act of 1934,85 was severely
outdated and not capable of being adapted to modem communications technolo-
gies. 86 In October 1984 Congress passed the Cable Communications Policy Act
of 198487 which significantly amended the Communications Act of 1934.88 The
1984 amendments address the problem of piracy of both over-the-air and cable
pay television signals. Although the 1984 statute does not resolve all the issues,
it goes far toward clarifying the uncertainties and ambiguities of the 1934 Act as
applied to modem pay television technologies.89 Like the North Carolina theft
of cable service statute, section 633 of the 1984 Act provides for criminal 90 and
83. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757 (1982) (amended 1984). An implied private cause of action under
§ 605 has been recognized for many years. See Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691, 694 (2d
Cir. 1947) (holding that § 605 created an implied civil action under which plaintiff could sue defend-
ant for secretly recording plaintiff's voice on the telephone and then "publishing" the communica-
tion by playing the tape in court). The courts have granted relief in private § 605 actions for the
unauthorized interception of both STV and MDS signals. See, ag., Movie Sys., Inc. v. Heller, 710
F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1983) (MDS signals); National Subscription Television v. S & H TV, 644 F.2d 820
(9th Cir. 1981) (STV signals).
84. Until 1984 there was much controversy over whether the 1934 Communications Act ap-
plied to the unauthorized theft of cable television service. See, eg., 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T.
CASEY, supra note 3, 26.02[l][b]; Comment, Decoding Section 605, supra note 3, at 364-66 & n.20.
Although the Communications Act of 1934 had been interpreted by courts as creating a private
cause of action and STV and MDS operators had been allowed to recover against thieves of their
over-the-air signals, see supra note 83 and accompanying text, the Act was not applied to cable until
the year immediately preceding passage of the 1984 amendment to the North Carolina cable theft
statute. In 1984 two federal district courts granted relief to cable companies in private civil actions
under § 605. See Cablevision v. Annasonic Elec. Supply, No. 83-5159 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1984)
(included as appendix in Ciminelli v. Cablevision (Ciminelli II), 583 F. Supp. 158, 163-64 (E.D.N.Y.
1984)); Cox Cable Cleveland Area, Inc. v. King, 582 F. Supp. 376 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
85. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757 (1982) (amended 1984).
86. See, eg., Comment, Subscription Television: Should the Government Prohibit Unauthorized
Reception?, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 291, 291 (1982); Comment, supra note 2, at 97.
87. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2779 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757).
88. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757 (1982) (Communications Act as it appeared before the 1984
amendments).
89. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
90. A person who intentionally intercepts cable services or assists another in doing so in viola-
tion of § 633 will face a fine of up to $1,000 or a prison term of six months or less or both. Pub. L.
No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2796 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(1)). When the violation of§ 633 is intentional and "for the purposes of commercial benefit
or private financial gain," the defendant "shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not
more than 1 year, or both, for the first such offense and shall be fined not more than $50,000 or
imprisoned for not more than 2 years, or both, for any subsequent offense." Id. (to be codified at 47
U.S.C. § 553(b)(2)). "Private financial gain" is defined so as to require more than the mere avoid-
ance of fee payments by a private individual who pirates cable services for viewing in the "individ-
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private civil actions against thieves of cable television service91 and explicitly
includes within its purview the manufacturers and distributors of unauthorized
cable interception devices. 92
The civil action created by section 633(c)(1) is very broad in scope and may
be pursued in any state court or federal district court.93 The class of potential
plaintiffs in a section 633 civil action is defined expansively to include "[a]ny
person aggrieved by any violation of [the substantive portion of section 633]." 94
Civil remedies include injunctive, compensatory, and punitive relief.95 Compen-
satory relief may include attorney's fees in addition to damages, which may be
either the "actual damages" suffered by the plaintiff plus any additional profits
earned by the violator as a result of the violation or a statutory default
amount.96 Section 633 accords a great deal of discretion to the trial court. If
the court finds that the defendant violated section 633 "willfully and for pur-
poses of commercial advantage or private financial gain," then the court may
add to the civil compensatory damages a punitive award of up to $50,000.97
Conversely, if the court "finds that the violator was not aware and had no reason
to believe that his acts constituted a violation of. . . section [633], the court in
its discretion may reduce the award of damages to a sum of not less than
$100."98
ual's dwelling unit." Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2802
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605(c)(5)).
91. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2796-97 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553). The substantive prohibition is found in § 633(a)(1):
No person shall intercept or receive or assist in intercepting or receiving any communica-
tions service offered over a cable system, unless specifically authorized to do so by a cable
operator or as may otherwise be specifically authorized by law.
Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1)).
Section 633 applies only "to theft of a service from the point at which it is actually being
distributed over a cable system." See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4655, 4720.
92. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2796 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553). Section 633(a)(2) states:
For the purpose of this section, the term 'assist in intercepting or receiving' shall include
the manufacture or distribution of equipment intended by the manufacturer or distributor
. . . for unauthorized reception of any communications service offered over a cable system
in violation of subparagraph (1).
Id. (to be codified at § 553(a)(2)). The manufacturer or distributor is liable (or guilty) under § 633
only if he created or sold the devices with the intention that they would be used to intercept signals
in violation of § 633(a)(1). See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4655, 4720-21; 1 C. FERRis, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 8.03
(Special Supp. 1985).
93. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2796-97 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)).
94. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(1)).
95. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)).
96. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)). The default amount is between $250 and
$10,000, determined on a case by case basis. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2)(C), (c)(3)).
In proving profits earned by the defendant as a direct result of the cable service theft, the plaintiff
only has to show the defendant's gross revenues, and the burden then shifts to the defendant to
establish "his deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the
violation." Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(A)(i)).
97. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(B)).
98. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(C)). Compare this broad discretion given to the
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Of tremendous importance to states like North Carolina that have adopted
statutes proscribing the unauthorized reception of cable television signals and
the marketing of devices designed to facilitate such service thefts is section
633(c)(3)(D) of the 1984 federal statute. Section 633(c)(3)(D) specifically states
that the federal statute does not preempt state laws that prohibit the theft of
cable television service. 99 Also, the legislative history of the 1984 Act indicates
that section 633 was not intended to circumscribe or preempt the application of
what was previously known as section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934
or other existing laws that provide remedies for the theft of cable service.100
Thus, neither the availability of a state claim nor the federal case law predicated
on the Communications Act of 1934 was affected by the 1984 changes.101
Since the new federal statute has not preempted North Carolina's theft of
service statute, it is useful to compare the statutes' provisions in determining
judge under the federal statute to increase or decrease the damage award with the rigid method for
calculating damages under the North Carolina theft of cable service statute. See supra notes 45-51
and accompanying text.
99. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2796-97 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(D)). The official legislative history explains the rationale behind
§ 633 (c)(3)(D):
The Committee recognizes that a number of states have enacted statutes which pro-
vide criminal penalties and civil remedies for the theft of cable service, and the Committee
applauds those efforts. [Such state laws] are not affected by this section, even if such laws
impose higher penalties or sanctions than those set forth in this section. The Committee
believes that this problem is of such severity that the Federal penalties and remedies con-
tained herein must be available in all jurisdictions (and enforceable in state or Federal
court) as part of the arsenal necessary to combat this threat.
H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4721.
It is apparent, therefore, that North Carolina's theft of cable service statute is not preempted by
the new federal law.
100. See H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4720 ("Nothing in this section is intended to affect the applicability of existing Section 605
[§ 705(a) after the 1984 Act] to theft of cable service, or any other remedies available under existing
law for theft of service.").
101. See supra note 84. In addition to the Communications Act of 1934, the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 occasionally has been mentioned as a potential source of relief
for cable companies plagued by cable television signal thieves. See Comment, supra note 2, at 117-
18; Comment, Decoding Section 605, supra note 3, at 363 n.3, 365-66 & n.20. The 1968 Act's provi-
sions prohibit both the unauthorized interception of wire and oral communications and the manufac-
ture and distribution of devices designed to facilitate unauthorized interception of such com-
munications. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511-2512 (1982).
Even though some commentators practically take for granted that the Crime Control Act's
protection of wire communications affords cable companies a cause of action against service thieves
and those who assist them, see Comment, supra note 2, at 117-18; Comment, Decoding Section 605,
supra note 3, at 363 n.3, 365-66 & n.20, there is no case support for such a position. See 2 C. FERRIS,
F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, % 26.02[2]. In fact, two federal district courts have explicitly
rejected the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 as a means for providing remedies
to cable television operators harmed by thefts of service. See Cablevision v. Annasonic Elec. Supply,
No. 83-5159 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 1984) (included as appendix in Ciminelli v. Cablevision (Ciminelli
II), 583 F. Supp. 158, 163-164 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)); Cox Cable Cleveland Area, Inc. v. King, 582 F.
Supp. 376, 382-83 (N.D. Ohio 1983). The original motivation for passing the Crime Control Act
apparently was to prohibit "wire-tapping and electronic surveillance by persons other than duly
authorized law enforcement officials." Id. at 382; see S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112-13; 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra
note 3, f 26.02[2]. Other than the actual language of the statute, which has been strictly interpreted
with the Act's purpose in mind, there is little reason to believe that the Act can be used by cable
companies to protect their economic interests against service thieves. See id.
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which claim is best for different plaintiffs. There are two major differences be-
tween the North Carolina statute and section 633 of the 1984 federal statute.
First, the federal act, unlike the North Carolina statute,10 2 does not contain a
provision creating a prima facie presumption of unlawful activity upon proof
that the defendant actually received the benefit of the illegally obtained services.
This apparent advantage to a plaintiff in an action under North Carolina stat-
ute's section 14-118.5 over a plaintiff in a federal action becomes somewhat illu-
sory, however, when one compares the definitions of the substantive offenses
under the two statutes. The North Carolina statute describes the offense as an
intentional act of connecting to a cable system or tampering with a cable system
for the purpose of receiving cable service;10 3 the new federal statute, however,
defines a violation as the mere unauthorized interception or receipt of cable serv-
ices.104 On its face, the North Carolina statute requires a higher degree of proof
of active wrongdoing by the defendant. The absence of a statutory presumption
in section 633, therefore, may not make the North Carolina statute a more at-
tractive basis for an action than section 633. Second, the North Carolina stat-
ute, in section 14-118.5(b), makes it unlawful for a party to distribute or sell
devices "designed to decode or descramble any encoded or scrambled signal
transmitted by [a] cable television system." 10 5 The language of the North Caro-
lina statute does not clearly require proof that the defendant distributor or seller
of interception devices specifically anticipated and intended that the devices
would be used to intercept cable signals illegally. Section 633(a)(2) of the new
federal statute, by contrast, requires proof that a manufacturer or distributor of
devices capable of illegally intercepting cable signals actually intended for the
devices to be used in such an illegal manner.10 6
Although both the North Carolina statute and the new federal statute cre-
ate causes of action for theft of cable services, North Carolina's statute appar-
ently does not extend to theft of over-the-air pay television services.10 7 The
federal statutes, on the other hand, have been applied to STV and MDS sys-
tems10 8 and should continue to apply in the future. Applicability of the federal
statutes to interception of aerial signals by satellite dishes, however, is more
complex. Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, before the 1984
amendments, generally had proved inadequate to deal with the issue whether the
102. See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
103. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(a) (Supp. 1984); see also supra note 27 and accompanying
text (giving language of § 14-118.5(a)).
104. See Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2796 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1)); see also supra note 91 (giving language of § 633(a)(1)).
105. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(b) (Supp. 1984); see also supra note 28 and accompanying
text (giving language of § 14-118.5(b)).
106. See Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2796 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2)); see also supra note 92 (giving language of § 633(a)(2)). Of course,
this analysis and distinction between the new federal statute and North Carolina's theft of cable
service statute would be irrelevant if the devices defendant was accused of manufacturing or selling
had no legitimate uses.
107. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text; notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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use of satellite dish antennas to intercept satellite transmissions was legal. 109
While "[a] federal district court in Florida [had] held that satellite transmissions
of live NFL football games transmitted to a specific audience were protected
under Section 605 from unauthorized reception by earth stations owned and
operated by a restaurant for commercial benefit," 110 there apparently was no
recovery under section 605 against a private individual using a home satellite
dish for noncommercial purposes.'11
The 1984 federal cable act redesignated section 605 in the Communications
Act of 1934 as section 705(a) and added provisions to this section.1 12 Section
705(b) provides an exemption from liability under section 705(a) for the inter-
ception for private use of certain "satellite cable programming" signals.1 13
"Satellite cable programming" is narrowly defined by the statute as signals
transmitted by satellite "primarily . . .for the direct receipt by cable operators
for their retransmission to cable subscribers."' 14 Under the section 705(b) ex-
109. See, ag., 2 C. FERUS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 1 26.02[l]; Comment, supra
note 2, at 103. In enacting its theft of cable service statute, the North Carolina General Assembly
resolved the issue by simply specifying that the use of satellite antennas would not be a violation of
the statute. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-188.5(f) (Supp. 1984); see also supra note 25 and accompa-
nying text (giving language of § 14-118.5(f)).
110. 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 26.02[l] (referring to National Foot-
ball League v. The Alley, Inc., No. 83-0701 (S.D. Fla. 1983)).
111. See id.
112. See Pub. L. No. 98-549, §§ 5-6, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2802-04 (to
be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605). The use of the phrase "section 705" in this discussion refers to § 705
of the Communications Act of 1934 as it appears after the 1984 amendment. Section 705 of the
Communications Act of 1934 corresponds to 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (Supp. 1985).
Section 705(d) creates criminal and civil actions and remedies identical to those found under
§ 633(b) and (c). See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. Prior to the 1984 Act, private civil
actions under § 605 [§ 705(a) after 1984 Act amendments] were merely implied. See 1 C. FERRIS, F.
LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3, 1 8.02[2] (Special Supp. 1985); supra note 83.
113. See Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2802 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605(b)).
Although § 705 does not clearly state that the interception of aerial pay television signals by
satellite dish antennas is generally unlawful, such a conclusion is compelled by the narrow exemp-
tion created by § 705(b). The logical implication of the integrated statutory scheme is that the inter-
ception of aerial signals by satellite dish antennas is illegal unless the interception satisfies the
exemption requirements of § 705(b).
114. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2802 (to be codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 605(c)(1)). The official legislative history explains that:
The interception of the "satellite cable programming" must in fact be directly from
the satellite feed in order to come within the terms of the exemption to liability set forth in
subsection (b). Unauthorized interception of such programming in its retransmitted form,
where the form of retransmission is otherwise protected under subsection (a) or other rele-
vant law, is clearly prohibited. Thus, if the programming interception is transmitted, for
instance, by means of. . .MDS. . .or STV, liability for such interception shall apply
regardless of whether [the conditions for the § 705(b) exemption have been met].
H.L REP. No. 934, 98th ong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4748-
49. Limiting the § 705(b) private interception exemption for satellite transmissions to those satellite
transmissions intended primarily for receipt by cable companies comports with Congress' desire not
to affect prior case law under § 605 [§ 705(a) after 1984 Act amendments]. It seems somewhat
arbitrary, however, to give the benefit of the § 705(b) exemption to private individual satellite an-
tenna owners whose antennas happen to intercept signals categorized by the statute as "satellite
cable programming" while at the same time denying the exemption to satellite owners whose satellite
antennas intercept other signals. The inequity of this situation would be much less severe if satellite
antenna owners were able to ascertain whether the signals being intercepted by their antennas were
eligible for the § 705(b) exemption; then, the satellite antenna owners could determine whether their
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emption, no violation occurs when "satellite cable programming" signals are
intercepted for private viewing if the signals are not scrambled and if a market-
ing system has not been created to allow individual satellite antenna owners to
pay for the right to intercept the signals. 115 North Carolina's cable television
theft statute specifically excludes satellite dish antennas from its prohibitions.' 16
Because the "purpose of section 705(b) is to facilitate a marketplace solution to
the specific situation in which an individual using a backyard [satellite dish an-
tenna] intercepts . .. unencrypted satellite cable programming," 117 section
705(b) would likely preempt any state statutes governing this type of
interception. 118
The North Carolina General Assembly reacted intelligently to the growing
contemporary problem of theft of cable television service by enacting a compre-
hensive amendment to the state's theft of cable service statute.' 19 The statute's
current provisions indicate that the general assembly made a realistic appraisal
of the scope of the theft problem and the plight of cable companies victimized by
service thieves. Cable companies that take advantage of the new civil action 20
will have the benefit of a logical presumption that the recipient of the illegally
activities were in violation of § 705(a) and could make conscious choices about how to structure
their behavior.
115. See Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2802 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605(b)); H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4745-46.
116. See supra note 109; note 25 and accompanying text.
117. H.R. REP. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4747.
118. The expansive nonpreemption language of § 633 (c)(3)(D), supra note 99 and accompanying
text, is limited by its terms to provisions of title VI. The nonpreemption language of title VII found
in § 705(d)(6) is not broad enough to encompass state laws governing signal interception by satellite
antennas. Section 705(d)(6) explicitly states that the new federal statute does not preempt state or
local laws prohibiting "the importation, sale, manufacture, or distribution of equipment by any per-
son with the intent of its use to assist in the interception or receipt of radio communications prohib-
ited by [§ 705(a)]." Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 2803
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(6)). Furthermore, § 633(c)(3)(D), which provides that nothing
in title VI of the federal statute bars states from enacting and enforcing laws "regarding the unau-
thorized interception or reception of any cable service or other communication service," id. at 2797
(to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(D)), clearly does not prevent title VII's provisions concern-
ing satellite signal reception from preempting state statutes attempting to regulate the unauthorized
receipt of satellite transmissions. It is logical, therefore, to presume that state statutes prohibiting
interception of satellite signals could not define as illegal an activity permitted under § 705(b). See
supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text. If the federal statute did not preempt state statutes
dealing with aerial signal interception by satellite dish antennas, at least to the extent of the exemp-
tion provided in § 705(b), then each state could effectively thwart the purpose underlying § 705(b).
See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. In this regard, it is important to remember the very
narrow scope of the § 705(b) exemption for satellite antenna interceptions. See supra notes 114-15
and accompanying text.
Any potential conflict between North Carolina's theft of cable service statute and the § 705(b)
exemption in the federal act is avoided because of the explicit provision in the North Carolina statute
that excludes satellite dish antennas from its prohibitions. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(f)
(Supp. 1984); supra note 109; notes 25 & 116 and accompanying text. The possibility of such a
conflict, however, certainly would become relevant should the North Carolina General Assembly
adopt a statute to regulate or prohibit the interception of aerial signals by satellite dish antennas.
119. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5 (Supp. 1984).
120. See id. § 14-118.5(c); supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
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obtained service was responsible for the theft, 12 1 and a plaintiff who successfully
establishes the elements of a civil claim is entitled to recover substantial statu-
tory damages even if actual damages cannot be proved or are less than the statu-
tory amount. 122 Also, by including as permissible defendants distributors and
sellers of devices designed to enable unauthorized access to cable television serv-
ices, 123 the North Carolina General Assembly has attempted to maximize the
efficiency and enforceability of the statute's provisions.
The significance of the North Carolina theft of cable service statute is some-
what overshadowed by the adoption of the new federal statute1 24 aimed at the
same activity. Because the federal statute expressly provides, however, for the
coexistence of state causes of action governing theft of cable service, 12 5 it is clear
that the North Carolina statute has not been preempted. Even though there are
a few obvious differences between the federal and the North Carolina theft of
cable service statutes,1 26 the ramifications of these distinctions and the relative
benefits of proceeding under each statute will be realized only as the statutes are
interpreted by courts. The existence of the new federal statute, however, should
not cause North Carolina judges to give a restrictive construction to North Car-
olina's theft of cable service statute, nor should the terms of the federal law be
looked upon as a limitation when applying the North Carolina statute. 127
Section 14-118.5 may be criticized on grounds that it should not be limited
to protection of cable television signals but should also encompass over-the-air
pay television signal transmissions. Such criticism is at least partially persua-
sive. Denying protection under state law to MDS and STV signals, which are
fully covered by section 705(a) of the federal Communications Act,'128 while
granting protection to cable television signals, may no longer be justifiable be-
cause the disparity that once existed in the protection given cable television sig-
nals and over-the-air pay television signals by federal law has now been
eliminated. 129 If the intent of the general assembly was to protect MDS and
121. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(e) (Supp. 1984); supra notes 54-55 and accompanying
text.
122. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(c) (Supp. 1984); supra notes 45-51 and accompanying
text.
123. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(b) (Supp. 1984); supra note 28 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 91.
125. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
126. For a brief discussion of some of the basic differences between the two statutes, see supra
notes 98 & 102-06 and accompanying text. Another distinction is that the federal statute provides
for the recovery of attorney's fees and costs by a prevailing plaintiff whereas the North Carolina
statute does not. See Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 633, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.)
2796 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2)(C)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(c) (Supp. 1984).
127. See supra note 99.
128. See supra notes 83 & 114 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
The over-the-air pay TV delivery systems, especially MDS, are expected to continue to grow
and expand, see supra notes 13-14, and the injury suffered by MDS and STV operators who are
victimized by service thefts is analogous to the injury inflicted upon cable television operators whose
services are stolen. Also, the federal case law developed under old § 605 [current § 705(a)] provides
complete protection to MDS and STV signals, see supra notes 83 & 114, in much the same way that
§ 633 provides unadulterated protection to cable television signals. See supra notes 90-98 and ac-
companying text. There are no categorical exceptions to or exemptions from the MDS and STV
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STV companies as well as cable providers, the definition of "cable system" in the
existing statute1 30 could be amended to include them. An even better solution,
whatever the general assembly's original intent, would be to enact a separate
statute, providing remedies similar to those in the new theft of cable service
statute, for thefts of over-the-air pay television signals involving devices other
than satellite dish antennas.13 1
Given, however, the nature of the unique statutory scheme in the new fed-
eral statute dealing with the interception of aerial signals by satellite antennas 132
and considering the potential constitutional implications of such regulation,133 it
signal protection under § 705(a) as there are for satellite to cable company signals under § 705(b),
see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text
(discussing prudence of not enacting state statute to regulate interception of signals by satellite an-
tennas at least until § 705(b)'s exception provisions are litigated).
130. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
131. The proposed statute would apply primarily to the interception of over-the-air signals by
decoder and converter devices. Therefore, an interception system composed of a satellite antenna
combined with a decoder or converter would be covered by the statute because of the use of the
descrambling device.
STV and MDS signals generally require a decoder or descrambler device for intelligible inter-
ception. See supra notes 13-14.
Even if the North Carolina General Assembly rejects the idea of enacting a statute making
illegal the unauthorized interception of aerial signals by devices other than satellite dish antennas, it
should at least consider proscribing the manufacture, distribution, sale, and possession for sale of
such aerial signal interception devices. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 593e (West Supp. 1985).
Adopting a separate statute to cover the interception of aerial pay television signals is preferable
to merely expanding the scope of the cable service statute because of the differences in the technolo-
gies and modes of delivery of the over-the-air systems on the one hand and of cable television sys-
tems on the other. The issues and problems that arise in each context, although definitely similar,
are not identical and could possibly merit very different treatment.
132. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2802-03 (to be
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605(b)); see supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
133. Although the amendment of the Communications Act of 1934 to prohibit some types of
satellite signal transmission interception by satellite dish antennas may have been necessary in order
to protect those who have a proprietary interest in such signals, some commentators have warned
that such a change in the law inevitably will create new privacy concerns. See, eg., Piscitelli, Home
Satellite Viewing: A Free Ticket to the Movies?, 35 FED. CoM. L.J. 1, 36 (1983). Their argument is
predicated on the fact that, unlike unauthorized decoder and converter devices, satellite dish anten-
nas have many legitimate uses. Id.; see also 2 C. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, supra note 3,
26.02[1][b] (noting that interception of "community-sponsored and advertiser-sponsored program-
ming" is a totally legitimate function of satellite dish antennas). Therefore, the existence on a per-
son's property of a satellite dish is not an absolute assurance that it is used to receive protected
transmissions. See Piscitelli, supra, at 35. From this basis, the critics assert that the means required
to confirm the use of home satellite dish antennas for illegal purposes pose major constitutional
questions regarding the privacy rights of the antenna owners. Id.
Conceding the logical appeal of such arguments, upon closer scrutiny it is difficult to distinguish
between the invasion of privacy implications of the methods employed to detect the use of a decoder
or converter device inside the home, see supra note 37, and the methods employed to detect the use
of a satellite antenna to gain access to protected signals. The fact that satellite antennas have some
legitimate uses and that decoder and converter devices do not is largely irrelevant to the present
analysis since converter and decoder devices are generally out of public view inside the home, and
often electronic surveillance is required to detect unauthorized interception of pay TV signals by
converter and decoder devices. Such use of electronic surveillance by a cable company to discover a
decoder device being employed to gain illegal access to MDS signals has been upheld against a
constitutional privacy challenge by at least one court. See Movie Sys., Inc. v. Heuer, 710 F.2d 492,
496 (8th Cir. 1983); supra notes 37 & 40 and accompanying text. The point of this discussion is not
to suggest that there are no valid constitutional objections to the use of electronic surveillance or
other techniques to discover the illegal interception of pay television signals by decoder devices or by
satellite antennas, but rather to recognize that the privacy issues presented by each method of signal
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would be prudent for the state to refrain from regulating the use of satellite dish
antennas to intercept over-the-air signals at least until the new federal law has
had an opportunity to develop. While the unauthorized interception of MDS
and STV signals under the federal statute134 is unconditionally illegal 135 and
thus no major conflicts between the federal and state laws prohibiting the unau-
thorized interception of such signals would exist, section 705(b) creates a rela-
tively complex exception when satellite antennas are used to intercept
unscrambled aerial signals. The enactment at the present time of a state statute
regulating the interception of signals by satellite antennas would only contribute
to the inevitable confusion that will occur as the federal statute is applied 136 and
would raise questions of substantive conflict between the federal and state
statutes. 13
7
Finally, it appears that the North Carolina General Assembly erred in not
including within the prohibitions of section 14-118.5(b) the actual manufacture
of devices designed to decode scrambled cable television signals. Section 14-
118.5(b) prohibits the distribution, sale, attempt to sell, and possession for sale
of the enumerated devices; 138 the failure to proscribe the manufacture of such
devices seems an illogical omission and could create an unnecessary loophole.
North Carolina's new theft of cable television service statute offers a
number of significant weapons to cable television companies in their fight against
cable service pirates. The statute is progressive and well- designed; by creating a
civil action with the potential for a recovery of treble damages, prospects for
achieving the ultimate goal of deterring cable theft activity appear to be
excellent.
WALTER D. FISHER, JR.
interception are substantially similar. Thus, the privacy concerns are no more compelling in one
situation than in the other and therefore should not be a catalyst for singling out satellite dish anten-
nas for preferential treatment.
134. Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 2802 (to be codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 605(a)).
135. See supra notes 83 & 112-115 and accompanying text.
136. For example, there will almost certainly be a great deal of controversy over what constitutes
a "marketing system" under § 705(b)(2) in determining whether the § 705(b) exemption is available.
137. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
138. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-118.5(b) (Supp. 1984).
1316 [Vol. 63
